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2 COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT AND RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
As described in Chapter 1 of this Report, the recovery observed in the Spanish economy 
since mid-2013 is the result of a combination of various factors, some predominantly of a 
temporary nature and others more long-lasting. Within the latter group, one of the most 
significant factors is the increase in recent years in the competitiveness of the Spanish 
economy, understood in a broad sense, encompassing both lower costs (labour and financing 
costs) and lower prices, compared with the euro area as a whole. This chapter assesses the 
role played by this process of competitive adjustment in the current expansionary period.
The adjustment in prices and costs, which has triggered the depreciation in the real exchange 
rate of the Spanish economy, gave rise in the early years of the crisis to a highly dynamic 
export performance and a significant correction in the external imbalance. In turn, the 
strength of export sales drove up demand for production resources, enabling the recovery 
in activity to spread to domestic expenditure components. Indeed, the export momentum 
encouraged both business investment decisions, which were also boosted by the decline 
in the cost of borrowing, and employment creation, in a setting in which the successive 
reforms of the regulatory framework of the labour market have brought wage costs and, in 
general, employment conditions more in step with different sector- and firm-specific 
developments. Lastly, the improved employment dynamic that has accompanied the 
present expansionary phase has prompted, inter alia, a significant recovery in private 
consumption, even against the backdrop of moderate wage growth.
The process of competitive adjustment analysed below has played a significant role in the 
progress made towards restoring the macroeconomic balance of the Spanish economy. 
This process is, however, far from complete, as illustrated by the combination of high 
dependence on imports, a substantial net external debt position and an unemployment 
rate that is still very high. To achieve further progress on these fronts, additional competitive 
adjustments will be needed and, in the longer term, a reform agenda to boost productivity 
momentum.
The recent economic crisis had a profound impact on the Spanish economy: between 
2008  Q2 and 2013  Q2, GDP fell by 9.3% and employment by 19.1%. Household and 
business income contracted, prompting a marked decline in their spending and in their 
contribution to public revenue. On the back of the recovery that began in mid-2013, GDP 
and employment regained 5.5 pp and 4.3 pp, respectively, but they are still 3.8 pp and 
14.8 pp below the pre-crisis highs.
During the expansionary phase, the falling cost of debt and plentiful credit, associated to 
a great extent with the start of monetary union, prompted strong demand growth. This in 
turn fuelled a positive inflation differential with the rest of the euro area and a relative 
increase in the price of non-tradable goods compared with tradable goods, against a 
backdrop of strong sustained growth in relative unit labour costs.1 These developments 
helped to slow down the growth in net exports, shifting resources into sectors producing 
non-tradable goods, especially construction, with the result that those activities gained 
excessive weight in the economy in terms of value added and employment, giving rise, 
in turn, to a disproportionate concentration of financial system risk in those sectors. 
1 Introduction
The Spanish economic 
recovery is progressing 
at a good pace, although the 
fallout from the crisis remains 
considerable
The prolonged expansionary 
phase that preceded the crisis 
resulted in severe losses 
in competitiveness, which 
translated into external deficits 
and economic overheating
1  See Chapter 4 of the 2014 Annual Report.
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The outcome was a very high and protracted external imbalance, which translated into a 
huge trade deficit and a growing net external debt position, reflecting the high levels of 
household and non-financial corporation debt.
The sharp drop in activity at the start of the crisis, as a consequence of the collapse of the 
international financial system and the end of the real estate boom, gave rise to a strong 
and rapid surge in unemployment and a marked slowdown in private domestic spending, 
in a setting in which both the budget deficit and government debt rose significantly. Lower 
domestic demand and growing exports prompted a narrowing of the trade deficit and a 
consequent decline in the external imbalance. In turn, higher unemployment and lower 
household and business spending gave rise to a large negative output gap and a 
deterioration of financial institutions’ balance sheets. That dynamic became more 
pronounced when, in the summer of 2012, the economy faced a sudden contraction in 
external financing flows.
The subsequent recovery has been based on a wide variety of factors. Some have been 
mainly short-lived, such as the drop in oil prices, the ECB’s quantitative easing policy or 
the expansionary stance of fiscal policy after several years of budget restrictions, and 
came into play essentially in the most recent period, driving up GDP and employment 
growth in 2015, as analysed in Chapters 1 and 3 of this Report. Another set of factors that 
explain the upturn in the Spanish economy go farther back in time and have more long-
lasting effects, owing to their role in helping to correct the sources of the imbalances that 
built up during the expansionary phase. In addition to certain other significant factors not 
directly analysed in this chapter, such as the recapitalisation and restructuring of the 
financial system, this second group includes the enhanced competitiveness of the Spanish 
economy, which is reflected in the relative price and cost adjustments.
Various monetary and financial policy decisions, including the above-mentioned 
recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish financial sector and the successive 
measures adopted by the ECB (the impact of which is analysed in Chapter 3 of this Report), 
also made a very significant contribution to economic recovery. One of the fundamental 
effects of those measures was the improvement in financing conditions, following the 
severe deterioration observed at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis that was manifested, 
in particular, in the wide differential that emerged between the cost of credit for Spanish 
agents and the cost of credit for their peers in the core euro area countries. The subsequent 
uptick in activity was underpinned by credit conditions converging towards those in force 
in those countries, constituting an additional source of improvement in the competitive 
position of the Spanish economy.
In the period elapsed since the onset of the crisis, the reversal of the competitive losses 
that had built up in the previous period has helped to restore the external balance of the 
economy, through relative price and cost adjustments. The share of exports in GDP has 
risen by almost 8 pp since the crisis began, up to 33.1%; this, together with the decline in 
the share of imports, has transformed a goods and services trade deficit of 6% of GDP in 
2007 into a surplus of 2.5% in 2015.2 Over time, the improvement in the competitive 
position has led to employment creation and has encouraged investment decisions, 
reducing the domestic imbalance, in a setting in which, in the most recent period, private 
domestic demand has become the driving force behind recovery.
The initial effect of the 
recession was a sharp upturn 
in unemployment and an 
improvement in the external 
balance 
Among the broad range of 
factors behind the economic 
recovery, enhanced 
competitiveness is key
Lower financing costs were 
also a source of 
competitiveness gains
Competitiveness gains have 
helped to improve the external 
balance and, more recently, 
to reduce the high level of 
unemployment
2  The non-energy trade balance has also improved, although somewhat less pronouncedly (by 6.3  pp as a 
percentage of GDP between 2007 and 2015).
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This chapter describes the competitive adjustment process resulting from these two 
developments – the correction of both labour and financing costs – and assesses the role 
they have played in the Spanish economic recovery. This competitive adjustment acts as 
a substitute for the effect of exchange rate devaluation, insofar as both channels permit a 
real effective exchange rate depreciation, which is why it is commonly referred to as 
“internal devaluation”. In Spain, the internal devaluation process began shortly after the 
onset of the crisis in the case of the correction of relative labour costs, and in the autumn 
of 2012 in the case of the improvement in relative financing costs.
Following this introduction, the second section of the chapter describes the channels 
through which competitiveness gains feed through to the different components of GDP 
and compares the recent experience in Spain with that of the crisis of the early 1990s. 
Subsequently, evidence is provided of the impact of competitiveness gains in terms of 
relative unit labour costs on exports and the difficulties involved in identifying similar 
effects on the import side are noted. The fourth section analyses how the decline in labour 
and financing costs in the economy may have acted as a catalyst for the uptick in domestic 
demand, and the chapter ends with a set of conclusions.
During the expansionary cycle that preceded the crisis, the Spanish economy had built 
up a significant external imbalance, which gave rise to an extremely high negative net 
international investment position verging on 100% of GDP. Correcting an imbalance of 
that magnitude requires shifting expenditure from goods produced abroad to goods 
produced in Spain, which in turn requires changes in relative prices. Where the exchange 
rate is available as an additional instrument, nominal exchange rate depreciation helps to 
restore the external balance, at least in the short term, making exports cheaper and 
imports more expensive. However, this kind of adjustment is not viable for an economy 
belonging to a monetary union, where relative cuts in domestic production costs and 
prices compared with foreign production costs and prices must come from the economy’s 
endogenous response to the recession, which may be reinforced by economic policy 
measures.
Although the internal devaluation process is an endogenous response to the onset of the 
crisis, different economic policy measures may affect the intensity and the duration of that 
response. In particular, as analysed in detail in Box 2.1, a crisis such as that which began 
in Spain in 2008 drives down private agents’ consumption and investment demand, giving 
rise to price and wage moderation in the economy. As domestic products become cheaper 
in relative terms, the real effective exchange rate depreciates, encouraging exports and 
discouraging imports. This partially offsets the fall in domestic demand and helps to 
mitigate the decline in activity and employment. The intensity of the internal devaluation 
process and, therefore, its effects on activity hinge on a wide range of factors, including, 
crucially, the degree of responsiveness of prices and costs to the fall in demand. Thus, 
economic policy measures that reinforce price and cost adjustments in the economy tend 
to intensify the beneficial effects of the internal devaluation process.
In particular, given the weight of labour in the production structure, labour market reforms 
designed to make it easier to contain labour costs play an essential role in promoting the 
internal devaluation process and prolonging its impact. Most especially, in light of the 
deterioration of the cyclical situation post-crisis, greater wage flexibility makes it easier to 
adjust costs and, ultimately, prices set by firms, enhancing competitiveness and prompting 
a stronger upturn in activity. In that respect, it is estimated that the 2010 and especially the 
2012 labour reform reinforced the process of moderation of unit labour costs (ULCs) that 
The correction of relative 
costs, or internal devaluation, 
is the natural alternative given 
the unavailability of the 
exchange rate as an 
adjustment tool
The chapter focuses on the 
role played by competitiveness 
gains in the recent economic 
recovery in Spain
2  Characterisation of the 
competitive adjustment
As the exchange rate cannot 
be used as an adjustment 
tool, the recovery in external 
competitiveness must be 
based on changes in costs 
and prices
Various economic policies 
may encourage the internal 
devaluation process,…
…including, fundamentally, 
reform of the labour and 
product markets
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had been observed since the crisis began,3 which not only had positive effects on firms’ 
competitiveness but also reduced their need to make workforce adjustments, with the 
consequent favourable impact on investment and private consumption. Moreover, reforms 
that make the product market more competitive maximise the positive effects of wage 
containment, as they encourage greater pass-through of competitiveness gains from 
costs to prices and, therefore, its impact on external flows (see Box 2.1).
In addition to wage flexibility, a wide range of factors condition the effects of an internal 
devaluation process. In particular, the greater the responsiveness of trade to competitiveness 
gains and the more favourable the external setting in which the internal devaluation process 
takes place, the greater the impact.4 In the framework of monetary union, the positive effects 
of an internal devaluation may be limited if the countries that need to achieve greater 
competitiveness at the same time account for a high proportion of the area’s GDP.5 
Furthermore, the process of price and wage adjustment may have limited effect if the zero 
lower bound on interest rates becomes binding.6 In that case, using unconventional monetary 
policies to reduce long-term interest rates (for example, through quantitative easing or forward 
guidance) helps to reinforce the positive effects of an internal devaluation process.7
An initial difficulty involved in measuring internal devaluation processes is the imperfect 
nature of the various indicators used to measure developments in competitiveness. Each 
of the different price-competitiveness measures includes different groups of products, 
which, for example, will not necessarily be subject to international competition in all cases 
or may in some instances include the effect of tax changes that distort the measurement. 
In addition, although labour cost indicators may be used to establish links between 
developments in competitiveness and the structural functioning of the economy, the 
information they provide on countries’ relative competitiveness may be incomplete, as 
they reflect only one of the important elements underlying the concept of competitiveness.8
Although the price-competitiveness indicators built using different measures of the real effective 
exchange rate all signal the large magnitude of the internal devaluation process that emerged in 
2008, the intensity of the adjustment observed varies according to the deflator used (see 
Chart 2.1). The improvement in competitiveness is most visible in terms of ULCs: using that 
variable, by 2015 the competitive losses accumulated from the start of monetary union up to 
2008 – verging on 20% – would have been almost completely corrected. That correction was 
initially based on a sharp uptick in apparent labour productivity, which grew at a cumulative rate 
The internal devaluation 
process is complex and 
its effects on activity 
and employment hinge 
on a wide range of factors
Measuring price-
competitiveness 
developments is no easy task
In any event, the indicators 
point to a considerable 
improvement in 
competitiveness since 2008, 
although uneven in scale 
and more pronounced in terms 
of ULCs...
3  See M. Izquierdo, A. Lacuesta and S. Puente (2013), “The 2012 labour reform: an initial analysis of some of its 
effects on the labour market”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España, pp. 17-25. Similar results were 
found recently in R. Domenech, J.R. García and C. Ulloa (2016), “Los efectos de la flexibilidad salarial sobre el 
crecimiento y el empleo”, Documento de Trabajo 1605, BBVA Research, and in European Commission (2016), 
Country Report Spain 2016, Commission Staff Working Document num. 78.
4  This is analysed in detail in J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural reforms in a debt overhang, 
Working Paper 1421, Banco de España. 
5  See, for example, J. Decressin, R. Espinoza, I. Halikias, D. Leigh, P. Loungani, P. Medas, S. Mursula, M. Schindler, 
A. Spilimbergo and T. Teng Xu (2015), Wage moderation in crises: policy considerations and applications to the 
Euro Area, IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/22.
6  This question is analysed in G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero and A. Raffo (2014), “Can structural reforms help Europe?”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 61(C), pp. 2-22, and in J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural 
reforms in a debt overhang, Working Paper 1421, Banco de España.
7  See Chapter 3 of this Report; Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2015), Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a 
Monetary Union, Working Paper 1540, Banco de España; and M.  Charpe and S.  Kühn (2015), Beggar or 
prosper-thy-neighbour? The international spillovers of labour cost, Research Paper num. 11, International Labour 
Organization.
8  For more details, see Chapter 2 of the 2011 Annual Report or A. Crespo, G. Pérez-Quirós and R. Segura-Cayuela 
(2011), “Competitiveness indicators: the importance of an efficient allocation of resources”, Economic Bulletin, 
January 2012, Banco de España, pp. 103-111.
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of 10% between 2010 and 2012, on the back of large-scale destruction of employment. 
Subsequently it was based chiefly on wage moderation, especially as from 2012.
However, if the real effective exchange rate deflated by CPI or producer prices is used, the 
correction of the high differential built up in the period 1999-2008 is more modest.9 In turn, 
throughout the period analysed the indicator that measures competitiveness based on 
export prices was notably more stable. This lower volatility seems to reflect the need for 
exporting firms to adapt to international competition, leading them to set prices in 
accordance with global market conditions and to adjust their margins to changes in costs, 
in order to remain competitive. Thus, during the pre-crisis period, when relative ULCs rose 
compared with the euro area, exporting firms endeavoured to transfer only part of those 
increases to prices, squeezing their margins. Post-crisis, when relative ULCs declined, it 
seems that firms did not pass the full effect through to prices, thus driving up export 
margins. Those higher margins could also be related, in part, to the increase in the cost of 
credit and the tighter credit conditions faced by Spanish firms in certain phases of the 
crisis. In light of those developments, non-financial corporations appear to have had greater 
recourse to internal funding, which not only enabled them to obtain financing at a lower 
cost, but also to accelerate deleveraging, with a view to enhancing their credit quality.10
From mid-2013, competitiveness gains were strengthened by the decline in interest rates 
on bank lending, which, especially in some segments, were very much higher than in the 
core euro area. They have since converged, following the various measures taken both in 
Spain (restructuring of the financial system) and at a European level (ECB monetary policy 
...than when other measures 
are used
Since 2013, competitiveness 
gains have been reinforced by 
improved financing conditions
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a REER: Real effective exchange rate.
b ULCM: Unit labour costs in manufacturing.
c Core euro area: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands.
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 9  In the case of the CPI-deflated real effective exchange rate, the discrepancy reflects, at least in part, various 
factors not directly related to the internal devaluation process, such as the increase in indirect taxes and 
administered prices in the period.
10  See J.M.  Montero and A.  Urtasun (2014), Price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish economy: a microeconomic 
perspective, Working Paper 1407, Banco de España. Indeed, including credit stock in export equations shows 
a negative correlation between the two variables, given the deleveraging experienced by manufacturing firms 
post-crisis.
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measures and changes in the institutional architecture of the euro area). Specifically, the 
interest rate spread over the core euro area for new loans to non-financial corporations 
under €1 million (which tend to coincide with lending to small firms) has narrowed by 1.5 pp 
since mid-2013, while in the case of loans over €1 million it has narrowed by 0.5 pp (see 
panel 2 of Chart 2.1).11 This decline in the cost of borrowing was accompanied by easier 
access to credit, as shown in the surveys both of credit institutions and borrowers and in 
the available data on rates of acceptance of loan applications received by credit institutions.
To characterise the current recovery of the Spanish economy, a comparison may be drawn 
with Spain’s recovery following the crisis of the early 1990s, even though the recent recession 
lasted much longer and was much more severe, hindering the comparison. Chart 2.2 illustrates 
how GDP, employment and the contributions of domestic and external demand evolved in the 
two episodes.12 In the case of GDP, the profiles of recovery from the cyclical trough are very 
similar, although the pick-up was slightly more pronounced in the crisis of the early 1990s. In 
particular, both recoveries are based on a similar upsurge in domestic demand. The differences 
are somewhat greater in the case of net external demand, which in the 1990s showed a 
positive contribution in the quarters immediately following the exchange rate depreciation but 
which gradually faded away after slightly more than a year. In the recent crisis, the external 
sector contribution was already positive in the years before the cyclical trough, in a setting in 
The profile of the current 
recovery in GDP shares some 
features with the profile of the 
recovery from the crisis 
of the early 1990s, although 
the recent recession lasted 
much longer
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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11  In the period considered, these two interest rates fell by 1.7 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively, in Spain.
12  A. Gómez Loscos and C. Martín (2014), “Una comparación de la respuesta del sector exterior en las dos últimas 
recesiones”, Boletín Económico, May, Banco de España.
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which competitiveness gains resulted in sustained export growth, while domestic demand 
continued to make a negative contribution to GDP growth.13 Imports rose as domestic 
demand recovered, so that even though sustained export growth continued, the contribution 
of external demand to GDP growth tended to fade. Lastly, employment generation has been 
stronger in the recent recovery, probably reflecting the containment of labour costs and the 
more flexible use of labour, in both cases related, at least in part, to the reform of the regulatory 
framework of the labour market.
Despite these similarities between the two episodes in terms of the profiles of recovery of 
GDP and the contributions of the domestic and external demand components, the external 
sector adjustment mechanisms were quite different in each case. In both recoveries the 
re-establishment of price-competitiveness favoured export growth, with a relatively similar 
correction in the real effective exchange rate measured using ULCs five years from the 
onset of each of the two crises. In the 1990s, however, that recovery in competitiveness 
was linked to successive exchange rate devaluations and the competitive gains were 
intense but they were also partly short-lived, as domestic costs and prices gradually built 
up a positive growth differential compared with the main European economies (see 
Chart 2.3). By contrast, the competitiveness gains achieved following the recent crisis are 
the result of a much more gradual domestic process of slow but steady adjustment of 
relative costs.
Since the internal devaluation process got under way, Spanish exports have been highly 
dynamic, more so than euro area exports as a whole, meaning that the international market 
shares of Spain’s exporters have evolved comparatively more favourably. This dynamism 
explains a significant portion of the marked correction in Spain’s external imbalance in 
recent years, as imports, which adjusted cyclically in the recession, have risen sharply since 
2014, in step with final demand (analysed in more detail in Box 2.2).
The main determinants that are usually considered to explain export performance include 
a scale variable that measures the external demand developments – proxied by the import 
volume of the countries of destination – and another that measures relative prices. 
Chart 2.4 shows the results of different estimates of the elasticity of Spanish exports to 
various competitiveness indicators, drawing a distinction between exports within the euro 
area and exports to the rest of the world. In general, the estimated responsiveness of 
exports in the long term is somewhat lower when the ULC-based indicator is used 
compared with other price measures. This appears to be because changes in costs are 
not typically passed through in full to prices, and are therefore only partially reflected in 
changes in margins.14 In terms of geographical breakdown, exports beyond the euro area 
are more responsive to the competitiveness variable; this could be because products 
exported to emerging economies generally have a lower degree of differentiation, meaning 
that price competition may be more intense. Panels 3 and 4 of Chart 2.4 show, as is usual 
in estimates of this kind, that external demand is the main determinant of exports. 
However, in the more recent period, competitiveness gains seem to have made a 
The current process is based 
on gradual cost adjustments 
and is more long-lasting
3  The impact of internal 
devaluation on Spanish 
exports
Since 2010, Spanish exports 
have been very dynamic
This positive export 
performance was underpinned 
by enhanced competitiveness 
13  For a more detailed analysis of the different sub-periods of the recent crisis, see E. Ortega and J. Peñalosa 
(2013), Algunas reflexiones sobre la economía española tras cinco años de crisis, Occasional Paper 1304, 
Banco de España. Note that the economic cycles have been dated to coincide with the quarters in which GDP 
reached its cyclical trough and do not coincide exactly with the dating used by the Spanish Economic Cycle 
Dating Committee (CFCEE) in Asociación Española de Economía (2015), “Fechado del ciclo económico 
español”, http://asesec.org/CFCweb/cf_index.htm.
14  In that respect, it should be precisely the exporting sectors (and other sectors where production, although essentially 
destined for the domestic market, is subject to competition from imports) where the pass-through to prices of changes 
to costs is less pronounced, given that firms in those sectors have comparatively less market power.
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significant contribution to the explanation for export growth. Available estimates signal 
that between 15% and 33% of export growth in the period 2010-2015 would have come 
from improvements in competitiveness, according to whether it is measured by export 
prices or relative ULCs.15
The two main determinants considered, that is, external demand and competitiveness, do 
not fully explain the recent dynamism of exports, as may be deduced from the residuals in 
the equations shown in Chart 2.4. A better explanation for the favourable export performance 
may be found by considering a broader concept of competitiveness, encompassing not 
only changes in relative prices and costs but also other factors such as the range or quality 
of goods and services. These additional elements are difficult to measure, which is why 
export market shares are often analysed as an indicator of competitiveness ex post, insofar 
as they measure the economy’s ability to adapt to shifts in external demand or competition 
from other countries. From that standpoint, the results achieved by the Spanish economy 
since 2010, approximately coinciding with the start of the process of recovery of 
competitiveness measured by prices and costs, should be viewed positively (see panel 5 of 
Chart 2.4).
External demand 
and competitiveness 
indicators do not fully explain 
the export performance, which 
signals that competitiveness is 
a complex concept that goes 
beyond prices and costs
15  The literature generally finds that the ability of cost or price-competitiveness indicators to explain export 
performance is quite modest. In A. Crespo, G. Pérez-Quirós and R. Segura-Cayuela (2011), “Competitiveness 
indicators: the importance of an efficient allocation of resources”, Economic Bulletin, January 2012, Banco de 
España, pp. 103-111, competitiveness explains almost 10% of changes in exports, compared with 80% for 
markets and slightly more than 10% for other factors.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness and Banco de España.
a Competitiveness indices calculated vis-à-vis 22 developed countries. Sample period: 1990-2013.
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In addition, domestic demand weakness during the protracted recession appears to have 
increased the incentives for firms to redirect their sales abroad.16 This would be reflected 
in higher export volumes at firms that were already exporting their products before the 
crisis, and in a higher number of exporting firms, which would seem to be particularly 
related to the role played by SMEs in export growth, an aspect that is analysed below. In 
this respect there is evidence, for the euro area as a whole, of a negative correlation 
between the likelihood of firms exporting and domestic demand performance.17
Not only may enhanced price-competitiveness have prompted an increase in the number 
of exporting firms, it may also have helped to attract foreign investment. In that respect, 
although the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Spain has not changed significantly 
since the crisis, the weight of the tradable sectors as a proportion of the total has increased, 
triggering a certain reallocation of resources to those sectors. A more disaggregated 
analysis shows that those sectors, within the tradable sectors, that have received most 
FDI tend to coincide with those that have recorded the highest rate of export growth.18
Using firm-level data it is possible to break down the aggregate export performance by 
number of exporting firms and average export volume by firm, commonly known, respectively, 
as the extensive and intensive export margins.19 A first point to note, in this respect, is that 
there is a growing correlation between export activity and firm size (panel 1 of Chart 2.5). 
Since 2010, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of exporting firms of all 
sizes, most particularly among SMEs with between 50 and 199 employees and also among 
larger firms. In fact SMEs account for almost all the growth in the extensive margin in the 
period 2010-2013. In the case of the intensive margin, SMEs account for almost half of 
the increase in the period, a proportion that is much higher in the case of sporadic exporters, 
reflecting their recent entry into global markets.20 Panel 3 of Chart 2.5 has a breakdown of 
aggregate export growth by intensive and extensive margin, also drawing a distinction by firm 
size. It shows that from 2011, the increase in the export base has gradually gained prominence 
as a factor behind the aggregate export performance.21
To analyse the differences observed between firms according to whether or not they 
engage in export activity, Table  2.1 sets out the results obtained from correlating the 
likelihood of a firm engaging in export activity with a set of characteristics. This analysis 
reveals that, on average, exporting firms have lower financing and labour costs, in the case 
of labour costs owing to their higher productivity, which allows them to pay higher wages. 
It also shows that the correlation between export activity and labour productivity has 
strengthened since 2010, making the role of ULCs even more determinant in the likelihood 
of a firm engaging in export activity.
The decline in domestic 
demand is also expected to  
have contributed to the recent 
favourable export performance 
as it has encouraged firms to 
seek new customers for their 
products
The increase in the export 
base may have been indirectly 
boosted by enhanced 
competitiveness, which may 
also have encouraged FDI
A microeconomic analysis 
reveals a clear increase in the 
export base, attributable in 
part to SMEs
Exporting firms have lower 
labour and financing costs 
and substantially higher 
productivity than non-
exporters 
16  See E. Prades and C. García (2015), “Actualización de la función de las exportaciones españolas de bienes”, 
Boletín Económico, April, Banco de España, pp. 31-39.
17  See H.  Vandenbussche (2014), “Firm-level productivity and exporting: diagnosing the role of financial 
constraints”, Product Market Review 2013: Financing the Real Economy, European Commission.
18  For an analysis of the impact of FDI on Spanish firms, see A. Rodríguez and P. Tello (2014), “El impacto de la 
inversión exterior directa sobre la productividad y el empleo del sector manufacturero español (2001-2010)”, 
Boletín Económico, January, Banco de España, pp. 105-115.
19  The information used comes from crossing data from the Balance of Payments, the Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office and the Annual Accounts deposited with Mercantile Registries [see C. Martín Machuca, A. Rodríguez and 
P.  Tello (2009), “Determinantes principales de la decisión de exportar de las empresas españolas”, Boletín 
Económico, December, Banco de España, pp. 30-42]. Export activity of SMEs may be under-represented as a 
consequence of the raising, in 2008, of the reporting threshold for the purposes of the Balance of Payments.
20  A sporadic exporter is understood to be a firm that has made sales to a specific export destination for fewer 
than four consecutive years.
21  See M.J. González and C. Martín (2015), “The internationalisation of Spanish SMEs: main developments and 
their determinants”, Economic Bulletin, December, Banco de España, pp. 13-22.
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Table 2.2 illustrates the results of an analysis based on a set of regressions correlating 
labour and financing costs at firm level with export growth, drawing a distinction between 
different sub-periods. The upper panel shows how a decline of 1% in a firm’s ULCs is 
associated with an increase of 0.6% in its exports in the period 2002-2007, and with a 
slightly higher increase as from 2010. In addition, a drop of 1 pp in a firm’s financing costs 
prompts an increase of 0.4% in its exports, although in this case a decline is observed in 
the more recent period, possibly owing to the growing importance of other factors that 
condition access to funding in a crisis setting. Regarding the impact of a firm’s costs on 
the intensive margin and the likelihood of a firm starting to engage in export activity, 
Table 2.2 also shows how an increase in ULCs tends to reduce the proportion of total 
sales bound for export markets in the medium term. At the same time, the adjustment in 
labour costs appears to have played a significant part in encouraging export activity at 
At firm level, there is a 
significant responsiveness of 
exports to competitiveness 
developments 
SOURCES: Banco de España, based on Balance of Payments, CBA and Mercantile Registry statistics.
a Margins calculated for firms whose size is known. Large firms include those with 250 or more employees.
b Extensive margin is defined as the contribution to the increase (decrease) in the value of exports resulting from an increase (decrease) in the number of countries 
to which a firm exports or with which it has "firm-country of destination" trade relations.
c Intensive margin is defined as the contribution to the increase (decrease) in the value of exports resulting from an increase (decrease) in the amount exported 
by each firm to each country.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a A total of 157,312 manufacturing sector firms (excluding manufacturers of coke and refined petroleum products) were analysed. Variables expressed in logarithms. 
Standard deviation in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The table reflects ratios of estimates according to the 
ordinary least squares of a dummy variable that has a value of 1 for exporting firms and of 0 for non-exporting firms.
Period 2001-2007     Period 2010-2013
Size (by number of employees)
     1.4000***
(0.005)
   1.861***
(0.008)
Capital/labour ratio
    0.646***
(0.007)
   0.832***
(0.013)
Labour productivity
    0.702***
(0.004)
    0.897***
(0.006)
Average wage
    0.180***
(0.002)
   0.191***
(0.004)
Unit labour costs (ULCs)
   -0.522***
(0.003)
   -0.705***
(0.006)
Indebtedness
   -0.018***
(0.001)
   -0.007***
(0.002)
Financial returns
    0.032***
(0.006)
   0.198***
(0.011)
Financial costs
  -0.011***
 (0.0004)
  -0.076***
(0.001)
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPANISH EXPORTING FIRMS (a) TABLE 2.1
SOURCES: Microdata of Banco de España's CBSO and Balance of Payments.
a Regressions include dummy sector and year variables.
  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
b Firm-level financial costs are proxied as the result of multiplying the stock of debt of each firm by average interest rates on the total stock of lending to non-financial 
corporations, drawing a distinction between amounts under €1 million (SMEs) and amounts over €1 million (large firms).
c Includes 25,697 manufacturing sector firms (excluding manufacturers of coke and refined petroleum products).
d Increase in exports to a given destination. Includes 27,547 manufacturing sector firms (excluding manufacturers of coke and refined petroleum products).
e Includes 91,549 manufacturing sector firms (excluding manufacturers of coke and refined petroleum products).
3102-01027002-20023102-2002srossergeR
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***90.0-    **50.0-   20.0-)etar raey-no-raey( sCLU
70.0-90.0-40.0-)etar raey-no-raey( stsoc gnicnaniF
2010-2013 compared with 2001-2007
ULCs (year-on-year rate) ´-0.2***     -0.2***
2.1-– )etar raey-no-raey( stsoc gnicnaniF
SMEs ´-2.4***    -1.9***
Dependent variables
Exports (year-on-year rate) (c)
Likelihood of starting to engage in export activity (e)
Exports, intensive margin (year-on-year rate) (d)
CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPORTS AND CHANGES IN LABOUR AND FINANCING COSTS AT FIRM LEVEL (a) (b) TABLE 2.2
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firms whose sales in the previous expansionary period were concentrated on the domestic 
market.22
After falling by more than 30% between 2008 and 2013, in the current recovery phase investment 
in capital goods is rising fast, posting growth of more than 10% in the last two years and now 
standing just 5% below the pre-crisis level.23 Improved financial conditions, lower uncertainty 
and, from a demand standpoint, export strength and, more recently, household consumption 
momentum, have all underpinned this investment buoyancy. In particular, it seems that 
competitiveness gains from relative costs and prices, through their positive impact on exports, 
have helped to revitalise investment, especially during the recession and in the first stages of the 
present recovery. The simulations made using the Banco de España’s Quarterly 
Macroeconometric Model show that wage moderation of 1% prompts growth in private 
productive investment, after two years, of between 0.4 pp and 1 pp, subject to the responsiveness 
of prices to wage moderation.24 Chart 2.6 shows how, from among final demand components, 
investment in capital goods has tracked exports much closer than it has tracked domestic 
demand (excluding investment in capital goods) since the crisis.
The financial position of Spanish firms has improved significantly in recent years: debt 
ratios have fallen by more than 30 pp and debt burdens by more than 15 pp from their 
respective highs in mid-2010 and end-2008. A microeconomic analysis reveals the 
correlation between these variables relating to the financial position of firms and their 
demand for factors of production. Specifically, the firms making the most investment 
efforts are those that have higher profitability levels and lower debt ratios and debt 
burdens (see Chart 2.7).25 This correlation appears to have intensified during the crisis 
4  The competitive 
adjustment and the 
recovery in investment, 
employment and 
private consumption
The deep adjustment 
observed during the crisis has 
been followed by a strong 
recovery in capital goods 
investment
The improvement in firms’ 
financial positions has also 
underpinned the upsurge 
in investment
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22  As analysed in S.  Decramer, C.  Fuss and J.  Konings (2014), How do exporters react to changes in cost 
competitiveness?, ECB Working Paper Series num. 1752, these results are subject to the endogeneity bias for 
ULCs, as wages and output are jointly determined by firms. However, when instrumental variables are used to 
solve this problem (specifically, the second and third lags of the explanatory variables), the results are similar.
23  By comparison, in the euro area as a whole, at end-2015 this variable was still 15% below its level at the start 
of 2008.
24  The pass-through to investment of the positive effects of wage moderation is greater when prices respond to 
wage containment in the same proportion, which is explained by the greater responsiveness of exports.
25  Debt burden, debt ratio and profitability are defined, respectively, as the ratio between interest payments on 
financing received and gross income, the debt-to-assets ratio and the ratio between a firm’s gross income and 
its average volume of assets in the period considered.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Each panel depicts the median value of the rate of investment in fixed capital or of the rate of growth in employment for three sets of firms, corresponding to 
the two extreme quartiles of the distribution and firms with an intermediate financial position (between percentiles 40 and 60) in terms of the relevant financial 
variable (profitability, debt ratio net of liquid assets and debt burden). Debt burden is defined as the ratio between interest payments on financing received and 
gross income (sum of gross operating profit and financial revenue); debt ratio, as the the debt-to-assets ratio (net of liquid assets); and profitability, as the ratio 
between a firm’s gross income and its average volume of assets in the period considered. Investment is the ratio between gross fixed capital formation and  
the stock of capital at the start of the period.
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when, against a backdrop of higher risk aversion, credit institutions when granting loans 
seem to have drawn greater distinctions between borrowers according to their financial 
solvency.26 In addition, the correlation intensifies when financial pressure crosses a 
certain threshold, above which firms present considerably lower investment rates, 
especially during the crisis.
The impact of a firm’s financial position on its demand for factors of production may be quantified 
by model estimates that differentiate between the pre- and post-crisis incidence of the variables 
used to measure firms’ financial strength. The results obtained using a methodology that allows 
this kind of distinction to be drawn are set out in Table 2.3. It shows that a higher net debt ratio 
or higher debt burden have a negative impact on investment and hiring at firms (although only 
over a certain threshold),27 while higher profitability has a positive impact. Based on these 
estimates, the effect of the fall in the cost of credit on investment at non-financial corporations 
may be tentatively estimated at 4% in cumulative terms for the period 2014-2015. 
The competitiveness recovery that began in 2008 was initially based on the increase in 
apparent labour productivity arising from the severe employment adjustment, with no initial 
response from wages to the abrupt about-turn in the business cycle. These developments 
triggered a very pronounced adjustment in agents’ consumption, as a result of the significant 
decline in labour income and the increase in precautionary saving in light of the perceived 
rise in aggregate uncertainty. Thus, in 2009, employment fell by more than 6%, which 
prompted – despite the high wage increase (4.4%) – a very marked slide (-3.7%) in private 
consumption (see panel 1 of Chart 2.8). At the same time, the household saving rate rose 
sharply – by more than 5 pp – to reach 13.4% of gross disposable household income.
The normalisation of financial 
conditions that began at the 
end of 2012 played an 
important part in reviving 
investment
The severe employment 
adjustment prompted sharp 
falls in private consumption 
in the first phase of the crisis
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Impacts obtained by estimating standard investment and employment equations, using the generalized momentum method (GMM), based on the CBSO database. 
Integrated for the period 1997-2014. *, ** and *** denote significance for confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
b Profitability is defined as the ratio between a firm’s gross income and its average volume of assets in the period considered; debt ratio, as the debt-to-assets ratio 
(net of liquid assets); and debt burden, as the ratio between interest payments on financing received and gross income (sum of gross operating profit and financial 
revenue).
c Number of firms: 92,780; number of observations: 387,125.
d The degree of financial pressure is established according to the debt ratio and debt burden indicators [see Note (b)]. p75 denotes percentile 75 of the distribution 
of those indicators.
Profitability t-1 Debt ratio t-1 Debt burden t-1 Profitability t-1 Debt ratio t-1 Debt burden t-1
Profitability it-1
year <2008; >2012
   **481.0     ***261.0    
Profitability it-1
2008-2012
  ***313.0      **851.0
    
***670.0-  900.0-**110.0- 420.0-
Financial pressure it-1
>p75; 2008-2012 (d) ***390.0-   ***170.0-   ***410.0-    ***660.0-    
971.0024.0133.0021.0490.0211.0nagraS
000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.01RA
291.0236.0535.0092.0103.0382.02RA
tnemyolpme no tcapmItnemtsevni fo etar no tcapmI
Financial pressure it-1
>p75; year <2008; >2012 (d)
IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF FIRMS ON THEIR RATES OF INVESTMENT AND LEVELS 
OF EMPLOYMENT (a) (b) (c)
TABLE 2.3
26  See Box 5.2 of the 2014 Annual Report.
27  As Table 2.3 shows, the negative impact of those variables on investment and employment is only material in 
the second sub-period.
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The protracted negative impact of the crisis on employment and the successive labour 
reforms approved altered this pattern, as a larger proportion of the adjustment at troubled 
firms began to be shouldered by wages. This is shown in Font et al. (2015) which finds 
evidence as from 2012 of greater wage responsiveness to unemployment compared with 
the first phase of the crisis.28 This greater wage flexibility would seem to have reduced the 
need for layoffs; in the quarters following the labour reform, the destruction of permanent 
jobs moderated and, overall, the employment performance was better than expected given 
the economic situation.29 Accordingly, the process of wage moderation appears to have 
encouraged job creation. Moreover, improved financial conditions have also given a further 
boost to firms’ demand for labour; specifically it is estimated that the decline in the cost of 
credit since mid-2013 may explain 0.8 pp of the employment growth observed in the period 
2014-2015 (see Table 2.3).
In turn, job creation seems to have encouraged consumption growth, offsetting a possible 
negative effect of wage moderation on household spending in the short term.30 Indeed it is 
reasonable to believe that if both households and firms factor in the beneficial medium-term 
effects of the containment of labour costs on investment and employment, the expansionary 
effects of higher household and business spending will outdo the contractive effects of wage 
moderation even in the short term (see simulations in Box 2.1).
The main determinants of private consumption usually considered in the literature are 
disposable income, wealth and interest rates. In the case of the recent recovery of the 
Since 2012 the wage 
moderation process has 
intensified, driving the 
recovery in employment…
…and also in private 
consumption
In the recovery period, 
the explanatory power of the 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Real wages are calculated based on compensation per employee (QNA, INE) and the private consumption deflator.
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28  See P. Font, M.  Izquierdo and S. Puente (2015), Real wage responsiveness in Spain: asymmetries along the 
business cycle, Working Paper 1504, Banco de España.
29  In M. Izquierdo, A. Lacuesta and S. Puente (2013), “The 2012 labour reform: an initial analysis of some of its 
effects on the labour market”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España, pp. 17-25, it is shown that 
positive residuals exist in an “Okun law” type correlation between employment and changes in GDP. 
Assessments of the effects of the labour reform published by other institutions (such as the OECD or, more 
recently, the European Commission) coincide in identifying a positive impact on net job creation of the greater 
wage moderation observed since 2012. See European Commission (2016), Country Report Spain 2016, 
Commission Staff Working Document num. 78, and OECD (2013), The 2012 labour market reform in Spain: a 
preliminary assessment, December.
30  In 2014-2015, a further factor behind private consumption growth was the expansionary effect of the drop in oil 
prices, which gave rise to a more expansionary performance of real labour income, in a setting of continued 
nominal wage moderation.
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Spanish economy, the equations that include those variables are not sufficient to fully 
explain the recent strength of private consumption; this is largely remedied when labour 
market variables such as changes in employment, the unemployment rate or outflows from 
employment to unemployment are included. This observation signals the importance of the 
improved labour market situation to explain the dynamism of household spending in the 
period.
The ability of the usual quantitative tools to explain recent changes in consumption 
increases when households’ disposable income is broken down by employment, real 
wages and real non-labour income, allowing the marginal propensity to consume to 
differentiate between those three components of household income.31 This breakdown by 
income source permits simulation of how consumption would have reacted had the recent 
recovery in labour income been based on wage rises, given a constant level of employment. 
The exercise shows that private consumption would have risen – in this scenario of higher 
wage increases but stable employment – by just 0.5% in 2014 and 1.1% in 2015, compared 
with the actual increases of 1.2% and 3.1%, respectively, based on strong employment 
creation and virtual wage stability in real terms.32
A quantitative analysis of the mechanisms of the relationship between consumption and 
employment may be made by analysing disaggregated consumer behaviour. Panel 1 of 
Chart 2.9 depicts the rates of change in consumption between 2009 and 2014 according 
to the employment situation of household heads. The improvement in the economic 
outlook between the two years prompted a recovery in spending among households 
where the household head had found employment, seemingly illustrating the direct 
channel through which an increase in income arising from new employment passes 
through to a higher level of consumption. Moreover, household spending was higher in 
2014, even among households that lost jobs or whose employment situation was 
unchanged. This seems to show that precautionary saving declined among those 
households in the most recent period, in light of the general improvement in the labour 
market situation, even if their own situation did not necessarily improve, as they believed 
they were less likely to lose their employment or more likely to find employment.33 Panels 2 
and 3 of Chart 2.9 present an additional exercise that depicts the scale of those effects. 
In particular, they illustrate how consumption performs according to the likelihood of loss 
of employment in 2009 and 2014, reflecting greater adjustment among households whose 
heads anticipated that they were less likely to keep their jobs, prompting an increase in 
saving at the start of the crisis.34
traditional determinants of 
private consumption increases 
significantly when labour 
market variables are included
There is some evidence of the 
beneficial effects of wage 
moderation,…
…through recovery in 
consumption among persons 
taking up employment and a 
decline in savings on the back 
of improved employment 
prospects
31  Intuitively, households in general will conceivably increase their spending more when they receive an additional 
unit of money in income from employment growth than when that additional euro of income comes from a wage 
increase. This is not only because households that find employment spend a larger proportion of that euro 
compared with households that receive wage rises in the same amount, but also because labour market 
improvements encourage households that already have employment to reduce their precautionary saving.
32  The difference between the two patterns represents a lower bound to the impact of wage moderation on private 
consumption, since this partial equilibrium exercise takes no account of other possible negative effects of the 
lack of containment of labour costs.
33  Precautionary saving in light of a possible risk of job loss has been documented for the case of Spain by 
R.G.  Campos and I.  Reggio (2015), “Consumption in the shadow of unemployment”, European Economic 
Review, 78, pp. 39-54, and by C. Barceló and E. Villanueva (2016), “The response of household wealth to the 
risk of job loss: evidence from differences in severance payments”, Labour Economics, 39, pp.  35-54. In 
particular, these articles find that households that are most exposed to job losses reduce their level of 
consumption and build up their financial wealth until that risk or uncertainty fades. For the United States, see 
C.D. Carroll, K.E. Dynan and S.D. Krane (2003), “Unemployment risk and precautionary wealth: evidence from 
households’ balance sheets”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, pp. 586-604.
34  See P.  Bunn and J.M.  Casado (2016), Precautionary savings and uncertainty during the financial crisis, 
forthcoming Working Paper, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 56 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 2. COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT AND RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The likelihood of losing employment is calculated based on the Spanish Labour Force Survery (EPA), while the change in consumption is obtained from Household 
Expenditure Survey data [see Bunn and Casado (2016) for more details].
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Lastly, the improvement in consumption in the period 2014-2015 is also underpinned by 
various other short-term factors relating to spending decisions that were postponed during 
the recession.35 In keeping with economic theory, the decline in consumption in Spain 
during the crisis was uneven between different types of goods and services. In particular, 
shifting (easily adjustable) demand for durables and non-durables into the future seems to 
have led to spending decisions being put on hold, giving rise, in the case of durable goods, 
to a need to rebuild stocks after the deep adjustment that took place during the recession 
(see panel 4 of Chart 2.9). A more disaggregated analysis shows that, between 2008 and 
2012, the adjustment in consumption of different kinds of goods was considerably more 
pronounced among households where the household head was unemployed (see panels 5 
and 6 of Chart 2.9). In addition, in the absence of data for 2015, the recovery in consumption 
in the economic upturn is proving to be more marked among households where the 
household head is employed, which are already increasing their spending on durable 
goods.
In mid-2013 the Spanish economy began to overcome the consequences of a crisis that 
has had a profound impact both on activity and employment. The recovery is the result of 
a combination of highly diverse factors, including the positive effects of policies applied 
both in Spain and at a European level, together with other more recent, more short-lived 
and predominantly exogenous factors. One crucial aspect that explains not only the 
current recovery but also the prospect that it may continue in the medium term is the 
process of enhanced competitiveness that began with the crisis. This chapter examines 
the role played by this process when it comes to explaining the present phase of the cycle, 
through its impact on foreign trade flows and on the various components of private 
domestic demand. The analysis performed considers two different sources of adjustment 
compared with the competing economies: on the one hand, relative prices of goods and 
services, and on the other, production costs, including both labour and financing costs, 
compared with other European economies.
The positive impact of competitiveness gains on the external imbalance of the economy is 
first revealed through their ability to boost exports. By contrast, on the import side, the 
pattern reflects a high degree of synchrony with changes in final demand, with no 
conclusive evidence found to demonstrate that purchases abroad are being replaced by 
domestic production. The strength of exports has driven up demand for factors of 
production, allowing the upturn in external demand to permeate through to domestic 
spending components, fomenting business investment and employment. In turn, the 
process of job creation observed over the last three years, which has benefitted from the 
advantage of it being easier to tailor labour costs and the flexible use of labour to different 
sector- and firm-specific conditions, has underpinned the recovery in private consumption.
As a result of the relative price adjustment, significant progress has been made in re-
establishing the macro-financial equilibrium of the Spanish economy. However, as indicated 
in Chapter  1 of this Report, this progress is far from sufficient. The external surpluses 
recorded are based in part on short-term developments and the improvements in cross-
border financial flows are still not sufficient to make a significant dent in Spain’s high net 
external debt, which is a source of vulnerability. Lastly, those positive balances with the rest 
of the world have been achieved in a setting in which, despite the significant progress made 
in reducing unemployment, full utilisation of productive resources, including labour, is still a 
Other short-term factors have 
also underpinned 
consumption
5  Conclusions
The competitive adjustment 
process is important to explain 
the Spanish economic 
recovery…
…that started in external 
demand developments and 
subsequently spread to 
spending by private domestic 
agents
The competitive adjustment 
process provides considerable 
support for the medium-term 
outlook, but it is far from 
complete
35  See J. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption dynamics in Spain by product type”, Economic 
Bulletin, September, Banco de España, pp. 29-37.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 2. COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT AND RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
very distant target. In order to achieve external surpluses and, at the same time, further 
reductions in unemployment, the competitive advantages gained in recent years will have 
to be maintained and further competitive advantages obtained in those areas where there 
is still room for improvement. In this setting, relative price adjustments are essential to allow 
resources to be reallocated to sectors with more capacity to generate added value and 
employment and successfully compete in international and domestic markets.
Moreover, from a long-term perspective, lasting competitive advantages will have to come 
from enhanced productivity, which in turn hinges on the structural labour and product 
market reforms analysed in Chapters 1 and 4 of this Report. In addition, this reform agenda 
is essential to ensure the efficiency of the process of price and cost formation in the 
economy and to underpin the productive reallocation of resources among firms and 
sectors and the reduction in the high unemployment rate.
In the longer term, an 
ambitious reform agenda is 
needed to address the 
challenges outstanding
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Both the severe economic crisis in the period 2008-2013, which 
tempered production costs and prices, and the 2010 and, 
especially, the 2012 labour reforms, designed to allow labour 
costs to adjust more efficiently to the macroeconomic situation, 
have helped the Spanish economy to regain competitiveness in 
recent years. However, the difference between these two factors 
suggests that it is important to determine which transmission 
channels operate in each case and their respective impact on 
economic activity and employment.
The dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Andrés, 
Arce and Thomas (2014) may be used to illustrate the 
macroeconomic effects of various shocks and policies that have a 
moderating impact on production costs and prices.1 Broadly 
speaking, this is a model of a small open economy belonging to a 
monetary union in which both firms and households take on long-
term debt to fund their spending and investment decisions.2 The 
model simulates two price and cost moderation scenarios: the first 
resulting from an economic and financial crisis similar to that 
experienced in Spain since 2008, and the second from reforms in 
price and wage-setting mechanisms.
In the first scenario, the effects of a negative financial shock 
leading to tight credit conditions for firms and households3 are 
simulated. The blue lines in Chart  1 depict the response of the 
main macroeconomic variables to the financial shock, which 
produces a severe contraction in new lending and sets in motion a 
protracted deleveraging phase that obliges firms and households 
to cut their consumption and investment spending, at the same 
time as they gradually pay off their previous debts. The fall in 
domestic demand gives rise to a sharp contraction in GDP and 
employment, which translates into a decline in real wages that is 
partly passed through to producer and consumer prices. As 
domestic products become cheaper, the terms of foreign trade 
decline, encouraging exports and import substitution; in addition, 
purchases abroad are further reduced by lower domestic demand. 
Accordingly, a negative demand shock similar to that experienced 
in Spain at the start of the financial crisis gives rise in that setting 
to a process of persistent decline in domestic costs and prices, 
fomenting an increase in net exports.
Subsequently, based on the previous scenario, a reform of the 
wage-setting mechanism that makes the labour market more 
efficient and nominal wages more flexible is included. This labour 
reform aims to proxy (albeit imperfectly) Spain’s 2012 reform.4 
The red lines in Chart 1 depict the response of the economy in 
that scenario; accordingly, the difference between the red and 
blue lines measures the impact of the reform. As the chart shows, 
the reform triggers a further fall in real wages and, therefore, in 
producer prices and in the terms of trade. This decline in costs 
and prices has an expansionary effect on demand for goods 
produced in Spain, in terms both of domestic demand (import 
substitution) and export demand.5 Moreover, GDP growth in the 
medium and long term foments higher investment spending in the 
short term, insofar as firms anticipate higher future demand. 
Lastly, the reform also boosts private consumption, largely 
because its positive impact on employment more than offsets the 
drop in real wages, with the consequent increase in labour 
income. In short, the introduction of a supply-side policy such as 
that analysed here may foment economic activity and employment 
even in the short term, against the backdrop of an economy hit by 
recession, with private sector deleveraging resulting from a 
financial crisis. The beneficial effects of internal devaluation on 
competitiveness are often weighed against the risk of delaying 
the deleveraging process and, in consequence, the recovery from 
recession, owing to the deflationary nature of reforms such as 
those analysed here. Interestingly, in the context of the model 
used, even in a highly indebted economy the labour reform 
considered does not have an overall negative impact on private 
sector deleveraging. There are two reasons for this: first, the net 
positive effect of the reform on wage income mentioned earlier, 
and second, the fact that, as there are long-term nominal debt 
agreements in place, the deflationary effect of the reform gives 
rise to only a moderate reduction in agents’ current real spending 
power, since the increase in the real value of debt payments as a 
result of lower inflation is inversely proportional to the maturity of 
principal.6
As indicated, external competitiveness gains are an important channel 
for transmission of the expansionary effects of an internal devaluation 
prompted by a labour reform. A crucial determinant of these gains is 
the speed at which production costs, and especially wage costs, 
BOX 2.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT AND TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF THE LABOUR AND PRODUCT 
MARKET REFORMS
1  J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas, Structural reforms in a debt overhang, 
Working Paper 1421, Banco de España,
2  This implies the lack of response by the common monetary policy to the 
specific developments of that small economy.
3  Specifically, a lasting reduction in loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of loans 
granted to firms and households.
4  In particular, higher efficiency is instrumented by reducing the mark-ups 
that workers apply to their wages over and above the level they would 
have under perfect competition. The decline in these mark-ups has been 
calibrated so that the reform has an impact of -0.9 pp on the year-on-year
   rate of growth of nominal wages in the seven quarters following its 
implementation, which is consistent with the effect of the 2012 labour 
reform estimated in own calculations by Banco de España staff. In 
addition, greater nominal wage flexibility is instrumented as a decline in 
the average duration of nominal wage agreements from four to three 
quarters.
5  Note that the reform has a scant impact on real imports as a result of two 
opposite effects: goods produced in Spain become relatively cheaper, 
which encourages import substitution, while higher domestic demand 
on the back of the reform drives up purchases abroad.
6  As shown by Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2014), op. cit. in footnote 1, 
where there are nominal debt agreements in place with similar maturities 
to those observed in Spain in mortgage loans to households and firms, 
interest payments and repayments of principal made in each period (in 
the model, in each quarter) are a relatively small portion of total payments 
throughout the life of the loan. In consequence, in the model, the fall in 
inflation as a result of the labour reform has a minor impact on the real 
value of those payments and, therefore, on the spending power of 
households and firms.
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BOX 2.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT AND TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF THE LABOUR AND PRODUCT 
MARKET REFORMS (cont’d)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
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SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF AN INTERNAL DEVALUATION BASED ON STRUCTURAL REFORM (a)
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Chart 1
EFFECTS OF TWO INTERNAL DEVALUATION SCENARIOS
 BASELINE SCENARIO (CRISIS)  LABOUR REFORM SCENARIO
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The table shows annual average effects compared with the no-reform scenario (the baseline "crisis" scenario in the chart). In the "base calibration" scenario, the 
labour reform includes increased nominal wage flexibility and elasticities both of exports and imports to the terms of trade are unitary.
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adjust. To illustrate the importance of this factor, Table 1 compares the 
effects of the reform described above (“base calibration”) with those of 
a reform that does not include increased flexibility of nominal wages. 
As the table shows, the absence of increased flexibility significantly 
reduces the expansionary effects of the reform, which may even 
become contractive in the very short term.
Another determinant of the short-term impact of the labour 
reform is the degree to which competitiveness gains are passed 
through to trade flows. In the base calibration of the model, 
both imports and exports have unit elasticity to the terms of 
trade, which is consistent with the evidence available for the 
Spanish economy.7 As Table 1 shows, against a background of 
lower elasticity, net exports would appear to be less responsive 
to wage and price moderation, considerably diminishing the 
impact of the reform, which could even be negative in the first 
year.8 In consequence, for the reform to be successful in the 
short term in terms of activity and employment, the resultant 
real effective exchange rate depreciation would have to have a 
sufficient impact on foreign trade flows, boosting both import 
substitution and export sales. Otherwise, the improvement in 
trade flows in the short term will be too feeble to generate 
sufficient employment to offset, in terms of total labour income, 
the impact of wage moderation.
Lastly, although to date the analysis has been limited to labour market 
reforms, simulation of the effects of reforms designed to achieve 
greater competitiveness in product markets is also relevant. The last 
line of Table 1 shows the effects of implementing the labour reform 
described above in conjunction with a reform of product markets, 
reducing firms’ mark-ups between the sale price of their products 
and the marginal production cost.9 As shown, including this reform 
significantly heightens the GDP and employment gains in the short 
term, largely through the competitiveness channel described earlier. 
Part of this additional positive effect in the short term is also explained 
by the fact that, despite its initial impact on inflation, the product 
market reform helps to shorten the duration of the severe deleveraging 
process among households and firms, facilitating faster recovery 
from recession.10 These results suggest that it is important to 
complement labour reforms with additional measures in the product 
markets.
BOX 2.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT AND TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF THE LABOUR AND PRODUCT 
MARKET REFORMS (cont’d)
7  See C. García, E. Gordo, J. Martínez-Martín and P. Tello (2009), “Una 
actualización de las funciones de exportación e importación de la 
economía española”, Occasional Paper 0905, Banco de España.
8  In any event, the expansionary effects as from the second year are 
robust to low elasticity.
 9  The size of the reduction in mark-ups is calibrated so that its impact on 
competitiveness (measured by the terms of trade) is approximately 
equivalent to that of the labour reform.
10  See Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2014), op. cit. in footnote 1, for a detailed 
discussion of the similarities and differences between the transmission 
channels of labour and product market reforms.
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The correction of the Spanish economy’s external trade imbalance 
that was first observed at the start of the crisis was essentially 
linked to the strong export performance. On the import side, there 
was first a marked adjustment, which lasted throughout the 
recession. In 2014, however, imports headed sharply upwards, in 
step with the growth in final demand (see Chart  1). Indeed, the 
expansionary behaviour of Spanish imports in the period 2014-2015 
resulted in the net external balance making a slightly negative 
contribution to GDP growth. This suggests that the lower import 
penetration vis-à-vis the pre-crisis level could essentially be a 
result of the adverse business cycle up to 2013, compared with the 
secondary role that may have been played by other more structural 
factors, in particular, the competitive adjustment of the economy.
The literature suggests that the strength of imports throughout the 
economic cycle is affected by the composition of GDP growth 
from the demand standpoint, given the differences in terms of 
import content of the various GDP headings. Specifically in the 
case of the current economic recovery in Spain, the most dynamic 
demand components, namely exports and certain sub-
components of private domestic demand, are characterised by 
their high import content (see Chart 2).1 This would help to explain 
the strong rate of growth of imports observed in the last two years, 
making it difficult to identify the opposite effects that the 
competitiveness gains described in the second section of this 
chapter may have had.
The importance of the composition of the recovery from the 
standpoint of demand aggregates when it comes to explaining the 
strength of imports in the last two years is confirmed by the 
analysis of purchases abroad from the standpoint of the branches 
of activity most closely related to the import process, such as 
those belonging to the manufacturing industry. In particular, there 
is a very high correlation between the propensity to import and the 
propensity to export in the industrial sectors (see Chart 3).2
The importance of the role of imports in meeting growing demand 
is confirmed by the fact that fluctuations in demand for finished 
goods within a specific sector tend to lead to commensurate 
changes in imports of finished products (see Chart  4), which 
possibly indicates that not all types of goods are manufactured in 
Spain. Moreover, the correlation between recent changes in 
imports by branch of activity and change in relative prices, 
although positive, is lower (see Chart  5), which suggests that 
price-competitiveness could also explain part of the changes in 
imports by branch of activity.
To make a quantitative assessment of the response of imports to 
the enhanced competitiveness recorded since the crisis, an 
equation has been estimated that allows the coefficients of the 
determinants of purchases abroad to change over time. This 
analysis shows that the response of imports to final demand has 
changed in recent years, declining at the start of the crisis and 
then subsequently recovering (see Chart  6). Moreover, the 
elasticity of imports to relative prices, which was slightly positive 
throughout the previous expansionary cycle, has been negative 
since the start of the recession (see Chart  7). This may be 
interpreted as a first sign that, in the more recent period, purchases 
abroad may have started to become more sensitive to 
competitiveness developments.
When changes over time in purchases abroad at firm-level are 
analysed, some additional evidence is found in favour of a certain 
level of import substitution in recent years, albeit to date still on a 
very modest scale. In particular, it seems that the composition of 
Spanish firms’ purchases of intermediate goods began to change 
as from 2012, coinciding with the heightened intensity of the wage 
moderation process, with a small increase observed in the weight 
of purchases of goods produced in Spain, to the detriment of 
those coming from the euro area, while at the same time the 
proportion of inputs from the rest of the world appears to have 
steadied (see Chart 8). This is further underpinned by the fact that 
the increase in the weight of inputs produced in Spain tends to be 
more pronounced in branches of activity where wage growth has 
been more moderate.
This evidence of the start of an import substitution process in the 
Spanish economy is highly tentative, indicating that, for the time 
being, the scale of the process is limited. The developments 
observed reflect the fact that reducing reliance on imports is a 
complex process that requires, by its very nature, a protracted 
period, even when it is accompanied by competitive advantages 
that foment the process. In particular, for that process to become 
widespread and to intensify, the range of goods produced must 
increase, and especially the proportion of high added value goods, 
which have relatively high import propensity. However, for that to 
happen, other ingredients are needed, such as a more highly-
skilled workforce and greater capacity for the development of 
technology innovation, and for implementation of existing 
technology, which are aspects where progress is expected to be 
achieved only gradually.
BOX 2.2IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
1  The chart depicts the import content of overall investment. Estimates 
made using the input-output tables show that the import content of the 
sub-component relating to investment in capital goods is even higher. 
See J. Martínez-Martin (2016), Breaking down world trade elasticities: a 
panel ECM approach, forthcoming Working Paper, Banco de España.
2  This correlation may be explained, for instance, by the growing 
importance of global value chains or the high reliance on purchases 
abroad for certain products (especially, high technology products) for 
which there is no domestic market substitute.
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BOX 2.2 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION (cont’d)
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SOURCES: OECD, INE, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness and Banco de España.
a The panels denote different aggregations of the manufacturing branches.
b Propensity to export is defined as the ratio of exports over production.
c Panel of firms for which there are observations for the entire period (estimation with time dummy variables, without fixed effects).

